Colloquium by Kathleen Harbin on "Aristotle on Akrasia: Beyond the Ignorance vs. Desire Debate"

Cuma, Mart 15, 2024 - 17:00
Aristotle on Akrasia: Beyond the Ignorance vs. Desire Debate
Kathleen Harbin (Assistant Professor, Ashoka University)
AbstractAkratic agents, like virtuous agents, at least seem capable of recognizing what they should do, and seem motivated to act accordingly. Their practical thinking thus bears strong similarities to that of those who act well, yet they do the wrong thing. This is mysterious, and Aristotle's explanation of the phenomenon can seem equally puzzling. In the voluminous secondary literature on his account, the central focus has been whether Aristotle argues for a Socratic account of akrasia, which holds that akrasia is the result of ignorance about which course of action is best, or instead a Platonic or commonsense account, which holds that akrasia results from a conflict between desire for the pleasant and desire to do what the agent knows to be best. I hold that Aristotle's view is not straightforwardly Socratic or Platonic, but seeks to accommodate the intuitions behind both kinds of account. His discussion of the akratic's thinking shows which of the agent's practical cognitive capacities fails in cases of akrasia, and this enables us to see both how the thinking of the akratic person diverges from that of the virtuous person, and how, despite this, the akratic (unlike the vicious person) might be cured. 
Friday 15th March, 17:00, JF 507

Son Güncelleme: 12:21:12 - 14.03.2024